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No. 20080937

I N THE U T A H COURT OF A P P E A L S

J U L I E A N N OLSON,

Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
U T A H DEPARTMENT OF H E A L T H ,

Defendant and Petitioner.

U T A H DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH'S R E P L Y B R I E F

The Utah Department of Health (DOH) files this Reply Brief in
support of its interlocutory appeal from the denial of its motion for
summary judgment.
REPLY ARGUMENTS
I.

The statute's plain language controls.
The district court created an additional definition of "demotion" to

include "disciplinary transfers" that have no accompanying reduction in
the employee's current actual wage. The district court's construction is
not supported by the plain statutory language. The Legislature defined
"demotion" as a "disciplinary action resulting in a reduction of an

employee's current actual wage/' Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-3(7)(a) (West
Supp. 2008) (emphasis added). And despite the district court's
construction and Olson's arguments, subsection (b)(i) does not define the
actions that constitute a demotion, instead t h a t section makes clear the
actions not constituting a demotion. 1
By statutory definition, a demotion requires a reduction in current
actual wage; that means a reduction in hourly pay, nothing more or
less. The term "current" is defined as "occurring in or existing at the
present time." Merriam'Webster

Online Dictionary(2009),

available at

http7/www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary. "Actual" is defined as
"existing in act and not merely potentially, existing or occurring at the
time." Id. And "wage" is defined as "a payment, usually of money, for
labor or services usually according to contract and on an hourly, daily or
piecework basis." Id. It is undisputed t h a t DOH restored Olson's
current actual wage. Under the ordinary and accepted meaning of each,
crucial statutory term, Olson was not demoted because she suffered no

1

(b) "Demotion" does not mean(i) a nondisciplinary movement of an employee to
another position without a reduction in the current
actual wage;
-2-

reduction in her current actual wage. The district court erred by not
granting DOH's motion for summary judgment.
Courts turn to other methods of statutory construction only when
the statutory language is ambiguous. State v. Gonzales, 2005 UT App.
538, If 9, 127 P.3d 1252; see also Housing Auth. v. Snyder, 2002 UT 28,
^j 10, 44 P.3d 724. Because there is no ambiguity, this Court's inquiry
should end with the statute's plain language.
Moreover, this Court should decline to apply exceptions to the
plain language rule. Contrary to Olson's assertions, applying the plain
language rule to the definition of demotion here, leads to neither absurd
results nor a contravention of expressed legislative intent. The absurd
result exception to the plain meaning rule is narrowly limited. State ex
relZ.C,

2007 UT 54, % 12, 165 P.3d 1206, 1209. Utah's appellate courts

recognize that it is not their duty to assess the wisdom of the statutory
scheme. Instead, a court's task is to "interpret the words used by the
legislature, not to correct or revise them. When the words are clear,
however incongruous they may appear in policy application, the court
will interpret them as written, leaving to the legislature the task of

-3-

making corrections when warranted." State v. Anderson,

2007 UT App.

3 0 4 , f 11, 1 6 9 P . 3 d 7 7 8 .
In sum, the absurd result exception "applies only where the result
is so absurd t h a t 'Congress could not possiblyhave
exrelZ.C,

intended' it."

State

2007 UT 54 at f 12 (quoting Pub. Citizens v. United

States

Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 470 (l989)(Kennedy, J., concurring))
(emphasis in original). Here, the Legislature intended an employee to
be demoted only when the employee suffers a reduction in current
actual wage. The 2006 statutory amendment makes that intent clear.
If the Legislature intended other actions to constitute demotions it
could have so stated. For example, prior to the amendment, this Court
found t h a t an employment action was a demotion if it resulted in "less
status, fewer responsibilities, a lower pay range, and will ultimately
result in commensurately lower retirement benefits" even if the grievant
suffered "no immediate loss of pay." Draughon

v. Dep't of Fin.

Inst,

1999 UT App. 42, If 10, 975 P.2d 935. If the Legislature intended that
result, it could have codified the Draughon decision, or left the term
demotion undefined. It did neither, and instead, used a more limited
definition. If t h a t definition is unwise policy, it is for the Legislature to
-4-

fix. Ultimately, the absurd result exception to the plain language rule
does not apply to this case.
The plain meaning of demotion also does not contravene the
Legislature's goals as set forth in the act. Section 67-19-3.1(2) does not
apply here because the "fair treatment" language applies only to claims
of discrimination based on membership in protected classes. The
section provides for "fair treatment of applicants and employees in all
aspects of h u m a n resource administration without regard to race, color,
religion, sex, national origin, political affiliation, age, or disability, and
with proper regard for their privacy and constitutional rights as
citizens." Olson has never claimed t h a t DOH took action against her
because of her membership in a protected class. That section simply
has no application here. The demotion definition does not contravene
any expressed legislative intent. 2

2

Olson implies that an employee can never challenge an
employment action that has no accompanying reduction in current
actual wage. That is not true. Employment actions t h a t are believed to
be illegal can be challenged with the aid of the Utah Antidiscrimination
and Labor Division, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,
and federal and state courts under Title VII, the Americans with
Disabilities Act, the Family Medical Leave Act, and Age Discrimination
in Employment Act, and other federal and state laws.
-5-

For the first time here, Olson argues t h a t DOH unfairly caused
her to pay attorney fees. Olson failed to make t h a t argument before the
district court, and the record does not support it. And, as Olson
acknowledges in a footnote, the CSRB cannot award attorney fees as
part of a grievance. Furthermore, the argument supports neither the
district court's improper creation of an additional definition of demotion
nor the concomitant expansion of CRSB jurisdiction.

H.

Draughon has been superceded by statute.
DOH agrees that the Draughon case has limited applicability

here? the controlling statute h a s changed. But the Draughon decision is
illustrative because it demonstrates the Legislature's intent by
inclusion of the express definition of demotion. The Draughon court
found no statutory support for DHRM's definition of demotion; the Act
did not draw the distinction between demotion and involuntary transfer
found in the DHRM rule. Id. at Tffl 10-11. The Legislature rejected the
court's definition and defined the term consistent with the original
DHRM rule. Thus, Draughon was overruled in so far as it was

-6-

superceded by statute. Because the controlling statutory language is
different, Draughon has no application here and can neither be affirmed
nor overruled.

CONCLUSION
For an employment action to be a demotion, the employee must
suffer a reduction in current actual wage. Here, the district court
improperly ignored the statute's plain language when it denied DOH's
motion for summary judgment. This Court should correct the district
court's statutory construction and reverse t h a t court's denial of DOH's
summary judgment motion.
Dated t h i s 5 \

day of March, 2009.

PEGGY W STONE
Assistant Utah Attorney General
Attorney for Defendant/Petitioner Utah
Department of Health
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